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Hill: Criminal Procedure - Wyoming Recognizes a Substantive Right to Ba

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Wyoming Recognizes a Substantive Right
to Bail Pending Appeal of Conviction. State v. District Court of
the Second Judicial District, 715 P.2d 191 (Wyo. 1986).
On April 18, 1985, a Lovell, Wyoming, jury convicted Dr. John H.
Story of felony sexual assault.' At sentencing, the trial court denied
Story's motion for bail pending appeal of his conviction.' Story was then
committed to the Wyoming State Penitentiary to serve his sentence.'
Story petitioned for habeas corpus relief, contending that the Wyoming Statutes created a substantive right to bail pending appeal and
4
denial of that substantive right constituted unlawful restraint. The District Court of the Second Judicial District granted Story's petition and
set bail pending Story's criminal appeal.'
The state appealed the grant of habeas corpus and release on bail. The
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and
recognized a substantive right to release after conviction under sections
7-11-507 and 7-11-511 of the Wyoming Statutes.6 The court also recognized
that, under these statutes, bail "shall" be afforded in all bailable cases'
and that release pending appeal of conviction may be denied only in a narrow class of nonbailable cases. 8
This casenote compares the unconditional postconviction bail right
under the Wyoming statutes with the conditional bail right recognized
by federal law. Examination of the conditional bail approach indicates that
Wyoming should amend its current bail statutes to comport with the "dangerousness" and "likelihood-of-flight" standards for refusing bail after
conviction.
BACKGROUND

Wyoming
With the exception of first and second degree murder, the Wyoming
bail statutes create an unconditional right to bail pending appeal. Section 7-11-507 of the Wyoming Statutes provides that upon application
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
1. Brief for Respondent at 1, State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 715 P.2d

191 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 85-171).
2. Id,
3. Brief for Petitioner at 5, State v. District Court (No. 85-171).
4. Brief for Respondent at 1.

5. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus under Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 8(h).
That rule provides for the right to bail before conviction and upon review. Subsection (h)
of the rule states that "[any accused person aggrieved by the application of this rule may
apply for a writ of habeas corpus."
6. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 196.

7. A "bailable" offense is any non-capital offense. The term "bailable" in the Wyoming Statutes incorporates article I, section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution, which provides: "all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when
the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted." Wyo. CONST. art.I,

§ 14.

8. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 191.
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of a convicted person, execution of the sentence against him shall be
suspended "until the next term of the court."9 Section 7-11-511 of the
Wyoming Statutes grants the postconviction bail right. That section provides that the court "shall" fix reasonable bail whenever the defendant
is convicted of a felony other than first or second degree murder. 0 Section 7-11-507 has remained unchanged since its adoption in 1876.1" Section 7-11-511 has appeared unchanged since 1909.11
In 1968, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the Wyoming Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that pending appeal, a judge
"may" admit a defendant to bail in all bailable cases. 3 Thus, the "may"
language of Rule 8(a)(2) directly conflicts with the language of section
7-11-511 that bail "shall" be provided in all bailable cases.
The authority to promulgate rules of procedure is given to the Wyoming Supreme Court by section 5-2-114 of the Wyoming Statutes." That
section grants to the Supreme Court the authority to adopt rules of procedure for all "courts of this state," in addition to those powers already
held by the court to adopt procedural rules for the Supreme Court itself. 5
Thus, in Barnes v. State,'6 the court found that a rule of procedure, to
the extent that the rule does not contravene a statutory or constitutional
' 17
right, "has the force and effect of law.'
The court's authority to promulgate rules of procedure is limited,
however, by section 5-2-115(b) of the Wyoming Statutes.'8 That statute
§ 7-11-507 provides:
Suspension of sentence on notice of appeal.
When a person shall be convicted of a felony, and shall give notice to the
court of his intention to apply for a writ of error, or other process by which,
according to law, cases are taken to the supreme court, the court shall, on application of the person convicted, suspend the execution of the sentence or judgment against him until the next term of the court.
10. Id. § 7-11-511 (1977) temphasis added) provides:
Custody after conviction and before judgment; bail; escape.
[Plrovided, that whenever a person is convicted of a bailable felony, except murder in the second degree, and the judgment shall be suspended as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the court to fix reasonable bail to be given by the
defendant ....
11. Id. § 7-11-507 (1977) reflects the original wording of id § 161, ch. 14 (1876).
12. Id. § 3326 (1887) was amended in 1909 to provide for bail pending appeal. This
language is currently found in id. § 7-11-511 (1977).
13. Wyo. R. CRaM. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added) provides:
(a) Right to bail.
9. WYO. STAT. ANN.

(2) Upon Review.-During the pendency of appeal, a judge or justice of
a court having jurisdiction may admit a defendant to bail in such sum as shall
be deemed proper in all bailable cases. The judge or justice allowing bail may
at any time revoke or amend the order admitting the defendant to bail.
14. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-114 (1977) provides: "The supreme court of Wyoming may
from time to time adopt, modify and repeal general rules and forms governing pleadings,
practice, and procedure, in all courts of this state, for the purpose of promoting the speedy
and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits."
15. Id.
16. 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982).
17. Id. at 1266.
18. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-115(b) (1977) provides: "Such rules shall neither abridge,
enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the
courts nor change provisions of any statute of limitations."
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nor modify" substanprovides that the court may not "abridge, enlarge
20
19
tive rights by the adoption of procedural rules. In Goodman u. State,
the court defined the scope of its powers under this provision. The court
recognized that "our rule making authority cannot extend so far as to
affect the substantive rights of our citizens and these concerns will be
left to the legislature." 2 The Wyoming Statutes granted Goodman a right
to jury trial in a Justice of the Peace Court. The state argued that, because
no rule of procedure provided for a jury trial for a justice court defendant,
Goodman did not have a right to jury trial. The court held that the right
to jury trial, when guaranteed by statute, is a substantive right. The court
held that the statute stood "unassailed by any rule of this court which
purports to either supersede the statute or with which the statute is said
to be in conflict."22 Thus, in Goodman, the Wyoming Supreme Court made
clear that no rule of procedure may supersede a substantive statutory
right.
Federal
Until 1966, Rule 46(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
governed postconviction bail. Then in 1966, the Bail Reform Act of 196623
supplanted the Federal Rule. Most recently, the Bail Reform Act of 1984
repealed the Bail Reform Act of 1966 and defined the24current conditional
right to bail pending appeal in federal proceedings.
Like the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided for the conditional release on bail of a convicted federal defendant.
Section 3148 of the 1966 Act20 limited the bail right, providing that
postconviction release could be denied where the appeal was frivolous or
taken for delay or where the convicted person was dangerous or posed
a risk of flight.2 6 Under the Act, the defendant carried the burden of showing that he would not flee and that he was not a danger to the communithe appeal was
ty.27 The government carried the burden of showing
26 that
frivolous or was taken for the purpose of delay.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
644 P.2d 1240 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 1243.
Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (1982); FED. R. App. P. 9(c).
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (Supp. Il1 1985) provides:
Release or detention Pending Appeal by the defendant.
The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an
offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal
or petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds:
(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee
or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released
pursuant to section 3142(b) or (c): and
(2) that the appeal is not for purposes of delay and raises a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.
Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (1982); FED. R. App. P. 9(c).
Id.
See United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id.
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To qualify for postconviction release under the 1984 Act, the convicted
person must first show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he "is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community if released. "2 Secondly, the 1984 Act requires that the convicted person demonstrate that he is not appealing "for the purpose of
delay" and that his appeal raises "a substantial question of law or fact"
likely to result in reversal or an order for new trial.30
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 marks a significant departure from the
former criteria for postconviction release and shifts the burden to the
defendant to show that he has met all the new Act's criteria.3 ' Thus, Congress has reversed the presumption in favor of the postconviction bail
right. In contrast, the unconditional bail right under the Wyoming statutes recognizes a virtually unlimited right to bail pending appeal.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In State v. District Court, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized
that the right to postconviction bail is a manifestation of the individual's
interest in his personal liberty.3" Although the court failed to provide
definition, "personal liberty interest" in the postconviction bail context
apparently refers to the defendant's right to avoid incarceration in the
event his conviction is subsequently overturned. 33
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in 1895, interpreted the Wyoming Constitution to require only a preconviction bail right.3" In State v. District
Court, however, the court found an interest of personal liberty in the
Wyoming Constitution. 3- Although only preconviction bail is a constitu29. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (Supp. III 1985).
30. Id

31. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (Supp. III 1985); see Affleck, 765 F.2d at 946.
32. State u. District Court, 715 P.2d at 194 (Wyo. 1986).

33. Id.; see State v. Sorrentino, 32 Wyo. 410, 233 P. 142 (1925). The Wyoming Supreme
Court commented upon the nature of the right to bail pending appeal:

Bail on appeal is not permitted simply for the purpose of delaying the payment of the penalty by law. The object, is to protect the defendant in his rights,
leave him there in status quo, pending the appeal, and not to put any undue
hardship on him if it should turn out that he is not convicted lawfully.

Sorrentino, 32 Wyo. at 411, 233 P. at 144.
34. In In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), the petitioner contended that
the
Wyoming Constitution granted the right to bail before and after conviction. Prior to
amend-

ment in 1909, section 3326 of the Wyoming Revised Statutes of 1887 required that a convicted person be committed to the sheriff's custody until completion of appellate proceedings
and did not expressly provide for bail pending appeal. The court held that the Wyoming
Constitution, reconciled with the statute, did not grant the right to bail pending appeal. The
court, however, recognized the right of the legislature to confer the bail right after conviction. "While we recognize the right of a constitutional grant so as to include persons sentenced
for a felony, this
court has no power and no inclination to invade the domain of the legislature."
Id at 265, 39 P. at 878.
35. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 195 (Wyo. 1986). There, the court stated:

In the declaration of rights in Article I of the Wyoming Constitution we find
a recognition of the inherent right to liberty; a requirement for due process
of law before a person can be deprived of liberty; a denial of absolute arbitrary
power over the liberty of free men; a provision about which more will be said,

that "[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great."
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tional right, the court held that postconviction bail is one aspect of the
interest in personal liberty. This interest, therefore, is substantive. The
to a statutory right
substantive interest in postconviction bail is converted
6
Statutes.
Wyoming
the
of
7-11-511
section
by
The state argued that Rule 56 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Pro3
cedure37 had superseded sections 7-11-507 and 7-11-511. 1 If those statutes
in the trial
questions
bail
place
would
had been superseded, Rule 8(a)(2)
of seclanguage
unconditional
the
that
contended
Story
discretion.
court's
tion 7-11-511 required that postconviction bail be afforded in all bailable
cases. 9 This bail right, Story 0asserted, is substantive and cannot be
superseded by procedural rule.4
Wyoming
The court agreed with Story and held that the scope of the
1
postconviction bail right is governed by section 7-11-511.' Recognizing
that section 7-11-511 creates a substantive bail right, the court2 found that
the statute could not be superseded by a rule of procedure.' The court
noted that, if the postconviction bail right is to be denied in Wyoming,
has main"it must be by action of the legislature which up until this
4 ' 3 time
tained a statute which grants that substantive right.
The court concluded that Rule 8 provides the procedure for setting
bail and admitting the convicted person to bail as required by section
of redress for denial of the sub7-11-511.44 Rule 8(h) provides the method
4
stantive bail right pending appeal. 1
36. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-511 (1977). The court goes out of its way to make this issue
needlessly difficult. Any right created by statute is substantive.
37. Wyo. R. CalM. P. 56 provides for the supersession of the 1957 versions of Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7- 11-507 to -511 (1977).
38. The state pointed to the noncompulsory language of Rule 8(a)(2) as granting to trial
courts the discretion to deny postconviction bail. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a judge "may"
admit a defendant to bail in all bailable cases. This language directly conflicts with the unconditional language of § 7-11-511 that bail "shall" be afforded in all bailable cases.
39. Brief for Respondent at 1.
40. Id at 14.
41. State u. District Court, 715 P.2d at 196 (Wyo. 1986).
42. Both the Wyoming Statutes and common law recognize this principle. Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 5-2-115(b) (1977) provides that procedural rules "shall neither abridge, enlarge nor
modify the substantive rights of any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts nor
change provisions of any statute of limitation." In Goodman v.State, the court recognized
that "our rule-making authority cannot extend so far as to affect the substantive rights of
our citizens and these concerns will be left to the legislature." 644 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Wyo. 1982).
43. State v.DistrictCourt, 715 P.2d at 196.
44. Quaere how a rule of procedure inconsistent with a statute can implement the requirements of the statute. The court failed to recognize that Wyo. R. CaiM. P. 8(a)(2) directly conflicts with Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-511 (1977). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that bail "may"
be granted in all bailable cases, while § 7-11-511 provides that bail "shall" be granted in
all bailable cases.
45. Id Wyo. R. CRiM. P. 8(h) provides that an accused person aggrieved by the application of Rule 8 "may apply for a writ of habeas corpus." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-17-104
(1977) requires that the writ of habeas corpus be sought before the nearest judge, which is
the Second Judicial District sitting in Rawlins for inmates at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The court found that Rule 8(h) expands habeas corpus to afford the District Court
of the Second Judicial District the independent authority to proceed in connection with the
issue of bail pending appeal. State u. DistrictCourt, 715 P.2d at 194. Where Story had been
denied his substantive bail right, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the district court
properly granted habeas corpus under Rule 8(h). Id at 196.
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Currently, then, the Wyoming bail statutes grant an unconditional,
substantive right to postconviction release. The Wyoming Supreme Court
correctly resolved State v. DistrictCourt under these statutes. This unconditional approach to bail after conviction is nevertheless problematical.
A more balanced approach to postconviction bail is needed.
ANALYSIS

In his concurring opinion in State v. District Court, Justice Brown
agreed that Story had a substantive right to bail pending appeal. Justice
Brown, however, articulated the concern that a convicted defendant could
pose a danger to those persons contributing to his criminal conviction,
especially witnesses and victims."
Although Justice Brown's point is well taken, the Wyoming statutes
reflect a different approach. The unconditional language of section 7-11-511
mandates that trial courts fix reasonable bail for all bailable offenders. 47
Thus, section 7-11-511 effectively nullifies Rule 8(a)(2) of the Wyoming
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The problems posed by postconviction release are real. Bail in the pretrial context is illustrative. Studies since the mid-1960s and their findings
regarding crime committed by persons on bail indicate an unnecessary
recidivist rate. The President's Commission On Crime in the District of
Columbia"8 examined release and recidivist rates in the District of Columbia between January 1, 1963, and October 8, 1965. Of 2,776 felony
defendants released on bail during that period, 207 or 7.5 percent were
subsequently rearrested on one or more felony charges." The Commission also found (1) that more than eighty percent of the recidivists committed crimes as serious or more serious than the original offense 5° and
(2) that eighty-eight percent of the two-hundred-seven recidivists had prior
adult arrest or conviction records in the District of Columbia."
Even in the face of these disturbing figures, however, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the wholesale denial of postconviction bail to
all convicted persons will not solve the problem. Rather, a more tempered
approach is needed; some persons do not pose the appeal problems associated with bail offenders. The foregoing statistics demonstrate that only
a few convicted persons are threatening. Thus, denial of bail to all, to stop
a few bail offenders, is incongruous and creates an entirely different set
of problems. It violates rights that the Wyoming Supreme Court has long
recognized as fundamental to the convicted person.
46. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 196.
47. Id.

48.

S. Doc.
49.
50.
51.

SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, PRES. COMM. ON CRIME IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

No. 317, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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The Interest of the Individual
Wyoming's unconditional approach to postconviction bail acknowledges that freedom is a highly valued personal right.52 At the very least,
the right to bail after conviction means that the defendant should not be
incarcerated until his conviction has been upheld on appeal.13
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized this prescription in State
v. District Court. The court characterized the right as inherent to liberty
and a requirement of due process of law before a person may be deprived
of liberty. 4 The court found this principle in the Wyoming Constitution's
declaration of rights.15 If the defendant is incarcerated, but his conviction is overturned on appeal, he will have been imprisoned on the basis
of an erroneous determination of his guilt, and his liberty interest will have
gone unprotected.
The Interests of the State
The conditional approach to postconviction bail, as typified by federal
law, addresses the concerns raised by Justice Brown. Contrasted to the
current Wyoming bail statutes, the conditional approach recognizes that
bail should be denied only when the defendant poses a danger to individuals or to the community or when the defendant poses a likelihood
of fleeing after his conviction.
Upon conviction of the defendant, the interests of society are threefold.
Society must protect itself from dangerous defendants; it must maintain
the integrity of the legal and correctional processes; and it must make
certain that the conviction is free of error which may result in the punish56
ment of an innocent person.
The question of whether future criminality can be predicted is one
which neither experience nor empirical analysis can conclusively answer.
Nonetheless, Congress recognized that certain combinations of offender
and offense characteristics"7 are strongly correlated with the probability
that the defendant will commit another offense while on bail or while released. 8 Thus, Congress believed that judges can, by considering these
and other factors, make such predictions with reasonable accuracy.59
52. Beletz, Post-Conviction Criminal Rights: Parole and Revocation and Bai 8
L. REv. 682, 695 (1974).
53. Id. at 695.
54. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 194-95.
55. Id
56. Beletz, supra note 52, at 694.
57. Congress referred to such factors as the extent of prior arrests and convictions and
the nature and seriousness of the offense in predicting the probability that the defendant
CREIGHTON

will commit another crime while on release.

SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BAIL REFORM ACT

OF 1983, S. Doc. No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1983).
58. Id Congress addressed the question of predictability with regard to release decisions in the context of pre-trial bail. Predictability considerations, however, have equal application to the dangerousness and likelihood-of-flight standards of postconviction release.
59. Id.
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By adopting the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress recognized that
once guilt of a crime has been established, a court should not grant release
unless it further examines the circumstances surrounding the conviction. 0
A conviction based upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt is presumably correct in law. 1
In United States v. Gilbert,62 the court addressed the question of
whether pre-trial detention was constitutional if a defendant threatened
the safety of witnesses. The court held that the judicial interest in detaining the suspect under these circumstances outweighs his statutory
right to bail. 3
In the postconviction context, the conditional approach also permits
the denial of bail where a substantial probability of danger to witnesses
or victims is posed by the defendant's release.64 The arguments advanced
in the pre-trial context have even stronger application in the post-trial
context where the defendant's presumption of innocence no longer exists.
The possibility of denying post-trial bail encourages participation in the
trial process by witnesses, whose safety is assured to a greater extent
than if the defendant is guaranteed postconviction release.
The federal conditional approach also allows judges to deny bail when
the defendant poses a likelihood-of-flight while his appeal is pending.65Congress recognized that, in some cases, bail and conditions of release do not
assure that the defendant will return to serve the sentence, if upheld."
The 1984 Act, like the Bail Reform Act of 1966, establishes that fleeing
after imposition of sentence, but prior to its commencement, is a violation of the bail-jumping statute.67 Penalties for bail-jumping under the
1984 Act have been modified to parallel more closely the severity of the
underlying offense for which the defendant was convicted.6 8
60. H. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

3209.

61. Id.
62. 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63. Id. at 491.
64. See Carbo v. United States, 369 U.S. 868 (1962).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1) (Supp. Il 1985). The defendant is released on bail pending
appeal if he shows by clear and convincing evidence that he "is not likely to flee."
66. Id.
67. The current bail-jumping statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). That
statute provides that a person commits an offense if after having been released pursuant
to the provisions of the chapter, "(1) he knowingly fails to appear before a court as required
by the conditions of his release or (2) he knowingly fails to surrender for service of sentence
pursuant to court order."
68. The penalties for the new § 3146 have been designed to parallel the penalty for the
offense for which the defendant was convicted. Under current 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Supp. III
1985), the penalties for bail jumping are: (1) up to $25,000 fine and ten years' imprisonment
where the offense was punishable by death, life imprisonment, or up to fifteen years imprisonment; (2) up to $10,000 fine or imprisonment for 5 years, where the offense was punishable
by more than five, but less than fifteen years' imprisonment; (3) a fine of not more than $5,000
and imprisonment for not more than two years, if the offense was any other felony; and (4)
a fine of not more than $2,000 and imprisonment for not more than one year, if the offense
was a misdemeanor.
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The conditional approach taken under federal law imposes, however,
an anomalous standard apart from the dangerousness and flight standards. Under the "substantial question" standard of federal law, the defendant must show that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or
fact likely to result in reversal or order for new trial.69 If the defendant
fails to meet this standard, the appeal is considered frivolous or taken
for delay, and bail is denied.
The "substantial question" standard has several disturbing features.
This standard requires a defendant seeking postconviction bail to submit his issues of appeal to the trial court to be admitted to bail. Thus,
a federal judge is asked to find that defendant's appeal is "likely to result
in reversal" of the jury finding or the court's own judgment. This standard places the trial judge in an incongruous position. If the trial court
admits the convicted person to bail, he has confessed the error of the verdict; if the trial court upholds the verdict, bail pending appeal is barred.70
The "substantial question" standard, then, represents the single flaw of
the federal approach.
If a defendant poses a threat to public safety or a risk of flight, releasing that defendant after conviction would be irresponsible. Federal law
supports this view by granting trial courts discretion to deny bail in such
cases." Under the conditional approach, the defendant has the burden to
show that he is not dangerous and that he will not flee."2 To this extent,
then, the conditional approach intrudes upon the defendant's liberty interest only when the defendant appears that he will not exercise that right
responsibly. The "substantial question" requirement, however, goes too
far. This standard has the unorthodox effect of forcing the trial judge to
sit in judgment of himself. Where the trial judge must find that the convicted person's appeal is "likely to result in reversal," it is simply unlikely that postconviction bail will be granted in the majority of cases.
Merging The Unconditional and ConditionalApproaches
Wyoming courts currently cannot deny bail to dangerous defendants.
Wyoming's unconditional approach to postconviction bail protects the
public only from those persons convicted of first and second degree
murder. All other criminal defendants, including those convicted of rape,
armed robbery, and other varieties of violent offenses, are statutorily entitled to the automatic postconviction bail right. Only by making bail
unobtainable through an excessive bail amount can Wyoming courts
assure a defendant's presence after appeal.
In his concurrence in State v. District Court, Justice Brown recognized this flaw in the Wyoming postconviction bail statute. Brown
asserted, however, that Rule 8(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Pro69. Id § 3143(b)(2).
70. Mandelbaum, Bail Pending Appeal in FederalCriminalCases-MajorChanges and
Questions Concerning the New 1984 Bail Reform Act, LX FLA. B.J. 59 (Jan. 1986).
71. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (Supp. III 1985).
72. See United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1985).
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cedure alleviates this problem by authorizing a judge to restrict the activities of one being admitted to bail after conviction.73 A literal reading
of Rule 8(c), however, indicates that those terms of release apply only to
one awaiting trial.74
Clearly, if the Wyoming postconviction bail system is to be sensitive
to Justice Brown's concerns, then the legislature must effect these changes
statutorily. The federal statutes address those concerns the Wyoming
system ignores. Through a "merger" of the unconditional and conditional
approaches, section 7-11-511 of the Wyoming Statutes should be amended to allow trial courts to deny bail to those defendants that present a
danger to the community or to those defendants likely to flee upon release.
Rule 8(a)(2) would then comport with and would implement the requirements of the postconviction bail statute.
By considering the defendant's disposition, the trial court can easily
balance the individual's liberty interest with the state's interest in a safe
community. When a defendant poses a danger to others or a risk of flight,
7
the state has compelling justification to deny bail. s Further, if the defendant does not meet the standards set for postconviction bail, then restraint
imposed to protect the public safety and to assure the punishment of
criminals does not offend the liberty interest of the defendant.
CONCLUSION

Section 7-11-511 of the Wyoming Statutes preserves the unconditional
right to postconviction release for all bailable felonies. This right is
substantive and may not be altered or limited by the Wyoming Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In State v. DistrictCourt, Justice Brown articulated the concern that
release of defendants after conviction may place the community at risk.
The conditional approach taken under federal law is responsive to Justice
Brown's concerns. Thus, the Wyoming legislature should adopt this approach to postconviction bail. Wyoming's criminal procedure would then
fairly and sensibly comport with the practical recognition that some defendants are undeserving of postconviction bail.
DRAKE

D.

HILL

73. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d at 196.

74. Wyo. R. CalM. P. 8(c) (emphasis added) provides:
(1) Any person charged with an offense other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the judicial
officer determines in the exercise of his discretion that such a release will not
reasonably insure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is made the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to
the above methods of relief, impose the first of the following conditions of release
which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no
single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions ....

75. Beletz, supra note 52, at 694.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/22
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